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
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**THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET CIVIL
DEFENSE
BY
Gerald R. Denny, Major, USAF**

A RESEARCH STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE AIR FORCE FACULTY

May 1979

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is a growing awareness in the United States, particularly in the military, that the Soviet Union is rapidly approaching its long term goal of surpassing the United States in both strategic and tactical military power. There is a continuous stream of articles, lectures, and reports on the latest Soviet advances in missile production, tank technology, and in their ability to mass an overwhelming concentration of firepower on a European battlefield. These advances represent a serious challenge for the United States, and are being recognized as such. However, there is one area of Soviet advancement that has received little attention, but which threatens United States' security as much as the growing Soviet offensive power. For the past twenty years, the Soviet Union has been investing more than one-billion dollars per year to develop a comprehensive, effective civil defense system to ensure their national survival during a nuclear war.

The author will examine why the Soviet Union has invested so much in civil defense and the results of this investment. How the Soviet civil defense system threatens United States' security

interests will also be examined and actions to reduce that threat will be recommended.

CHAPTER II

WHY THE SOVIETS NEED CIVIL DEFENSE

"The Soviet Union has the largest and most comprehensive war survival program in the world today. . . . The focal point of the program is the USSR Civil Defense structure. . . ." This recent estimate by Dr Leon Goure, one of the most respected experts on the Soviet civil defense system, describes a growing Soviet capability which the United States has not attempted to match or even understand. (2:1) The United States has discarded the concept of civil defense as politically undesirable and operationally impossible. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said that "Our efforts (to imitate Soviet civil defense) would almost certainly be self defeating. . . ." (1:65) If the United States is not interested in civil defense, then why does the Soviet Union feel that it is essential?

The answer to this question has its roots in Soviet history and in Marxist-Leninist ideology, and is explained in many Soviet writings from 1917 to the present. Although the Soviets maintain strict secrecy about almost everything, they have never attempted to hide their strategic concept of warfare. They feel that a nuclear war is highly probable and that the Soviet Union must,

and will, win that war. In this context, the Soviets feel that an effective civil defense system is mandatory.

War as an Extension of Politics

Soviet decision-makers have consistently maintained that war is an extension of politics, as opposed to current Western thinking that war occurs only when politics have failed. Lenin said:

With reference to wars, the main thesis of dialectics. . . is that war is simply the continuation of politics by other (i.e., violent) means. Such is the formula of Clausewitz, one of the greatest writers on the history of war, whose thinking was stimulated by Hegel. And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded any war as the continuation of the politics of the powers concerned. (8:219)

In 1965, Western thinking was epitomized by Henry Kissinger, who said: "The traditional mode of military analysis which saw in war a continuation of politics but with its own appropriate means is no longer applicable." (6:291) In spite of this pronouncement, the Clausewitzian concept of the relationship of war and politics is still maintained by Soviet leaders. In November 1975, Communist of the Armed Forces, an important Soviet military journal, stated: "The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in military matters." (2:xx) In the Soviet view, war is not an unthinkable horror that foreshadows the end of the world, it

is an acceptable means to accomplish the goals of communism. Modern warfare, at its various levels of intensity, is a very useful means for pursuing the Soviet goal of world peace through communist domination.

War Is Inevitable

To complement this utilitarian theory of war, Soviet ideology stresses that war is inevitable, or at least highly probable. Marxist-Leninist theory says that war is an unavoidable step in the scientific process of social change from capitalism to communism. A former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Foy D. Kohler, said "There is the long-standing Leninist principle that capitalist states, as they come closer and closer to final defeat may resort to war regardless of seeming odds against them in a desperate attempt to save themselves." (2:xvii) Although this theory was downplayed during the Khrushchev days, when the United States was in a position of unquestioned strength, it begins to take on new meanings as the Soviet Union's "correlation of forces" grows stronger and is more capable of successfully challenging the United States. In the Soviet view, the growing Soviet strength makes it more likely that they will subject the capitalist states to defeats which will make them resort to war rather than peacefully submit to communist rule.

The advent of "peaceful coexistence" has only slightly

changed the Soviet perception of the inevitability of war, although it has been misinterpreted by many Western policymakers to mean the end of hostile competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1960, Khrushchev said that "Peaceful coexistence is not a state of tranquility but one of development and struggle." (9:167) His concept of peaceful coexistence is based on the "scientific fact" that the continuing revolutionary transformation of world society will accelerate the collapse of capitalism and that the Soviet Union must be prepared to lead the world to its communist destination. In 1970, in an editorial in Kommunist, the Soviet view of peaceful coexistence was again explained:

The policy of peaceful coexistence in its Leninist understanding signifies neither the preservation of the social or political status quo, nor the moderation of the ideological struggle. It has facilitated. . . the development of the class struggle against imperialism inside individual countries as well as on a world scale. . . (7:187)

If peaceful coexistence has moved war out of the "inevitable" category, it has moved it only as far as "highly probable" in the Soviet mind. Communist Party Secretary L. I. Brezhnev reaffirmed this view of war when he said that it would be dangerous if the public believed that the threat of war was illusory, and that he was convinced that wars and acute international crises were not a matter of the past. (27:47)

Nuclear War

There is little argument to the premise that the Soviets historically view warfare as an extension of politics and as a highly probable, if not inevitable, step on the path to a communist world. However, many Western theorists argue that the advent of nuclear weapons has changed the very essence of warfare and that Clausewitz's dictums no longer apply. They maintain that the effects of nuclear warfare would be so devastating to both sides that war can no longer be considered a useful tool for implementing national policy. Unfortunately, this concept is Western in origin and has not been adopted by the Soviet strategists. The Soviets have never attributed any transmutative qualities to nuclear weapons, but they have praised their increased usefulness and their ability to hasten the attainment of strategic objectives. Communist of the Armed Forces states:

The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons leave war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war . . . ceases to be an instrument of policy and does not constitute its continuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary. (2:xx)

The Soviets do not separate warfare into conventional wars or nuclear wars, as we do. They write about local wars, which may or may not be nuclear, and world wars, which will be nuclear. The late Marshal Grechko classified wars as:

- 1) War between states (coalitions) of two contrary social systems - capitalist and socialist.
- 2) Civil wars between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
- 3) Wars between imperialist states and peoples of colonial states fighting for their freedom.
- 4) Wars among capitalist states. (5:347)

Richard Pipes, the Baird Professor of History at Harvard University, said that, in the Soviet view, a teachers' strike in the United States, a guerilla attack in an African nation, and nuclear warfare differ only in degree, not in essence. He further stated that "All such conflicts are calibrations on the extensive scale by which to measure historic conflict which pits communism against capitalism and imperialism." (9:60)

In every Soviet definition of warfare, wars are classified in social, economic, or political terms and not in accordance with the use or nonuse of nuclear weapons. In the Soviet view, war is still an extension of politics and technological advances such as nuclear weapons cannot change that fact.

Nuclear War Is Thinkable

For more than twenty years, theorists and strategists in the United States have been hypnotized by the awesome power of nuclear weapons and believe that a nuclear exchange would mean the end of the world. Critics of the Defense Budget continuously complain that the United States has enough nuclear warheads to destroy the world two, three, or four times over.

They claim that the use of nuclear weapons by a nation would result in that nation's destruction, as well as the rest of the world's.

The United States' strategic deterrence policy is based on the belief that the United States has sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union. However, the United States' definition of what is "unacceptable damage" and the Soviet Union's definition are certainly quite different. In his DOD Annual Report for FY 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown defined "assured destruction" as "the destruction of a minimum of 200 major Soviet cities." (1:55) However, Marshal Grechko has said that in World War II, the Soviets suffered 20,000,000 casualties, and had 1,710 towns, 70,000 villages, and 32,000 industrial establishments destroyed, but still won the war and emerged as a global power. Since 1914, the Soviet Union has lost an estimated 60,000,000 people from wars, famine, and purges while the United States has lost only 650,000 from all its wars since 1775. (29:62,66) This vast difference in experience must give the Soviet Union an entirely different concept of "unacceptable damage" from that held by the United States. The amount of damage expected by the Soviet Union during a nuclear war is not "unthinkable" to the Soviets because they have already experienced this type of loss. This does not mean that Soviets would willingly accept this damage;

but, on the other hand, the Soviets do not go into a catatonic state of mental paralysis whenever the subject of nuclear war is broached. In the Soviet view, nuclear war is thinkable.

Nuclear War Is Winnable

To the Soviets, nuclear war is not only thinkable, it is also "winnable." The Soviets do not see nuclear war as the end of all things, but as a phase of sociological development that the world may have to pass through. They state that "There is profound erroneousness and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologies that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war." (3:60)

To the Soviets, victory in a nuclear war does not mean that the Soviet Union must escape unscathed while destroying the United States. According to Dr Leon Gouré, the Director of Soviet Studies at the University of Miami, for the Soviet Union to win a nuclear war, they would have to survive as a nation with enough military and economic power remaining to recover faster than the United States. (27:49) To help ensure that they will have this capability to recover, the Soviets have been investing one-billion dollars a year in a civil defense program. (2:2) This program is designed to protect the political infrastructure, the industrial facilities, and cadres of skilled technicians that will allow the Soviet Union to recuperate faster than the United States from a nuclear exchange.

In the Soviet view, a credible civil defense system is mandatory for the Soviet Union to emerge victorious in a nuclear war which their ideology tells them is inevitable and their history tells them is winnable.

CHAPTER III

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

To establish this credible civil defense system, the Soviets have embarked on a high priority, long-range program. The Soviet Union has had some type of civil defense system since the Local Anti-Air Defense was established by the USSR Council of People's Commissars in 1932. The Civil Defense Program (Grazhdanskaia Oborona) was reorganized under the Ministry of Defense in 1961 but did not gain real importance until 1966. During the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in that year, Secretary L. I. Brezhnev called for large improvements in civil defense and the Congress adopted a resolution endorsing these improvements. Since that time, the size and scope of the Soviet Civil Defense Program have been growing, with increasing momentum. Dr Leon Gouré recently described this phenomenon:

. . . Soviet authorities appear to allocate resources at a level which appears to be appreciably higher than the estimated average of one-billion dollars per year of the past two decades. This is indicated by decisions to increase the rate of shelter construction. . . and to improve the survivability of industry. . . . The expanding scope of civil defense exercises also attests to the seriousness of the effort now being made to raise the operational readiness of civil defense to a new and higher level. (2:2)

Civil Defense Goals

The mission of the Soviet Civil Defense Program is not limited to protecting the population from the effects of a nuclear attack, but is a systematic approach to ensuring the survivability of the Soviet nation as a political and economic entity both during and after a nuclear war. The stated goals of the Civil Defense Program are:

- 1) protecting the population from weapons of mass destruction;
- 2) preparing national economic installations for work stability under conditions of enemy attack;
- 3) conducting urgent rescue and emergency resoration operations at sites of destruction. (11:6)

Population Protection

To protect the population, the Soviet Union has implemented a multi-faceted program which includes training, evacuation, and shelters. Civil defense training is mandatory for all Soviet citizens. More than 100 hours of training is given to school children between the 5th and 11th grade, not counting civil defense competitions and exercises conducted outside of schools. (4:29) Refresher training for adults continues until age 60 for men and 55 for women. The various youth organizations conduct civil defense exercises, as do most schools, factories, and urban districts. Until recently, the emphasis has been on evacuating the population from high risk areas.

Under this concept, city-dwellers were each assigned an evacuation area and a means of transportation to that area. Although the majority of the population was required to walk, the evacuation plans were simple and would probably be effective. This method of protection required several days' strategic warning, however, and would be impossible to conceal from United States intelligence sources. Since 1975, the emphasis has shifted to sheltering all of the key workers and leaders required to keep the factories and the government running, while continuing to evacuate nonessential personnel. Large underground shelters have been constructed near Moscow to shelter the political leadership, and shelters large enough to hold several thousand workers have been constructed near essential industrial facilities. (26:54) The Soviets explain this shift in emphasis from evacuation to shelters by stating that:

. . . The aggressor in the event of unleashing war might make an attempt to carry out a pre-emptive nuclear rocket strike. . . In these conditions the time for protective measures of civil defense might be very limited. . . Consequently, today the plan to shelter the population in protective shelters has been placed in the forefront as the most reliable method of preserving people's lives from nuclear rocket weapons. (32:72)

Not mentioned is the fact that the Soviet use of shelters instead of evacuation eliminates one source of advance warning of a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear attack on the United States.

Industry Protection

The uninterrupted flow of industrial production during war-time is a key tenet of Soviet military doctrine. Marshal of the Soviet Union, V. I. Chuikov stated that "The conduct of any war is impossible without the continuing supplying of the armed forces with everything it needs." (4:26) In addition to supplying the armed forces during the war, an intact industrial base is essential for the Soviet Union to recuperate faster than the United States after the war. It is for these reasons that a major goal of the Soviet Civil Defense Program is stability of industrial facilities under enemy attack. To accomplish this, the Soviets have implemented a three-phased program which includes ". . . engineering-technical, technological, and organizational measures." (11:179)

Engineering-technical measures are implemented during the planning and construction of new facilities. They include dispersion of the facility, protection of critical components, shelters for all workers, hardening of power supplies, and protection of unique equipment. Technological measures concentrate on the procedures used in the factory to reduce secondary damage caused by a nuclear attack. Organizational measures include the training, civil defense plans, and exercises that the factory management and workers practice to enhance their survival in a nuclear attack. (11:180)

This three-phased program will greatly reduce damage to the Soviet's industrial base during a nuclear attack and will facilitate its recovery after the attack.

Civil Defense Organization

To carry out this massive Civil Defense Program, the Soviet Union has created a large, effective civil defense organization. The head of this organization is Colonel-General A. T. Altunin. The importance that the Soviets attach to civil defense is indicated by the fact that General Altunin has been elevated to the position of Deputy Minister of Defense and has been promoted to full membership in the Central Committee. (2:23) Under Colonel-General Altunin, civil defense is divided into military and civilian organizations.

The military side of the civil defense organization is the Civil Defense Troop. This is a major arm of the Soviet Armed Forces, and is on the same level as the Strategic Missile Forces, the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Civil Defense Troop consists of between 70,000 and 100,000 men, organized into battalions and stationed throughout the Soviet Union. Their primary missions are to maintain communications, to assess damage, and to conduct post-strike reconstruction requiring heavy engineering equipment. Civil Defense Troop officers are trained at a four-year Civil Defense Academy located in Moscow. (2:74)

The civilian side of the civil defense organization

consists of over 30 million people, and pervades all levels of both the administrative structure of the Soviet Union and the functional chain-of-command. The administrative structure contains civil defense authorities at every level from the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, through the Soviet Republics, regions, and cities to rural districts and villages. The real strength of the civilian civil defense organization, however, lies in its functional structure. Starting at the top, in the government ministries and their subordinate organizations, there are civil defense offices at every level of the entire Soviet economy. This includes the transportation, communication, education, and manufacturing systems. Within each of these systems, the civil defense chain-of-command runs from the Soviet Ministry to the individual plant or classroom. At each level there is a civil defense chief and staff responsible for organizing the volunteer civil defense units. There are estimates that from 20 to 70 percent of all workers in the Soviet Union belong to civil defense formations. (2:68,74) These workers are organized and trained to limit damage during a nuclear attack and to rapidly restore essential services after an attack.

Effectiveness

The Soviets have a large, well organized Civil Defense Program on which they have been spending \$1 billion per year

for the past twenty years; but, how effective is this program? Estimates range from moderately ineffective to 96 percent effective.

Representative Les Aspin has discounted the Soviet Civil Defense Program as "highly exaggerated" and ineffective against a United States' second strike. He contends that the Russians have paid only lip service to required training and exercises. (21:1) The Soviets themselves have criticized some of their civil defense planners for not conducting realistic training and have publicly chastized some factory and mine supervisors for inadequate civil defense preparations. However, Dr Leon Gouré stated that ". . . the fact that party and administrative officials undergo civil defense training in increasing numbers and that the party and administrative organs take an active part in supervising and supporting the program, ensures that the program will be essentially carried out, and that the preparedness of the population and of the country for war survival will be significantly improved." (2:215)

There are many United States' defense analysts who rate the Soviet civil defense efforts quite highly. A study by Boeing Aerospace Company stated: "Our analyses confirm the validity of published Russian estimated of population survival (ninety-five to ninety-six percent). . . . (26:53) Dr Eugene P. Wigner, a Nobel Prize winning physicist from Princeton University said

that "The maximum damage we could inflict on them would be less than four percent of the population. They could destroy or threaten to destroy forty-five percent of our population." (26:53)

The effectiveness of the Soviet's civil defense program is further attested to by a Boeing Study which concluded that the Soviet Union could recover from a nuclear war "within two to four years, contrasted with an estimated twelve-year recovery period for the United States." (26:53) A study commissioned by the National Security Council in 1974, called PONAST, concluded that the Soviet Union would lose less than five percent of its population in a nuclear attack if they evacuated their cities. (24:46)

Regardless which side of this argument is closer to the truth, the fact is the Soviets have taken long-range, systematic steps to ensure their national survival in a nuclear war. The degree to which these steps will actually protect the country's economic and political base is not as relevant as the fact that the Soviets have taken the steps and we have not. A program of this size and duration cannot have failed to raise the level of civil defense preparedness of the nation as a whole, and to have greatly enhanced the survival of key economic and political segments of the society. This increase in survivability becomes especially significant when compared to the complete lack of a similar program by the Soviet Union's primary competition, the

United States. This area of Soviet superiority may be sufficient to tip the balance of power, even if only in the Soviet mind, to the point where the Soviets will attempt to gain significant advantages in the world arena.

CHAPTER IV

THE THREAT TO DETERRENCE

We have established that the Soviet view of the world mandates they have an effective civil defense program; further, they have undertaken a long-range, systematic program to achieve this capability. However, a Soviet capability does not represent a threat to United States' security interests unless the Soviets intend to use it to the disadvantage of the United States. To determine whether or not the Soviet civil defense capability is a threat, we must first examine the strategic framework within which the United States and the Soviet Union operate; second, we must discuss the conflict between United States' interests and Soviet's goals; and last, we must evaluate the possible effect on United States' interests if the Soviets can use their superior civil defense capability to accomplish their goals.

The Strategic Framework

Since World War II the primary goal of US nuclear strategy has been deterrence. The primary target of our deterrence strategy has been the Soviet Union. Although variations of this strategy have ranged from "massive retaliation" and "containment" to "flexible response" and "essential equivalence",

the basic goal of deterring the Soviets from endangering US security interests has remained a constant. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown reiterated this concept when he said "The main objective of our collective security system must be the maintenance of an overall military balance with the Soviet Union. . . Deterrence and stability. . . are what we seek." (1:3)

The underlying US strategy for accomplishing this goal has been called "assured destruction", and this strategy has also remained a constant. Major General Jerome E. O'Malley, former Plans Division Chief on the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, said that "The capability of a sufficient portion of our strategic forces to ride out a surprise attack and still inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor has been the foundation of our deterrent throughout the nuclear age." (28:41)

The definition of what constitutes the assured destruction of the Soviet Union was first given by Robert S. McNamera in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1967. He said that the United States must have the capability of responding to a Soviet first strike by destroying one-third to two-thirds of their industry and killing twenty to twenty-five percent of the Soviet population. He contended that this level of destruction "would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any industrial nation and thus would serve as an effective deterrent." (10:52)

Secretary Brown reaffirmed the strategy of assured destruction when he said: "It is essential that we retain the capability at all times to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union, including destruction of a minimum of 200 major Soviet cities." (1:55)

It is clear, then, that the strategic framework of deterrence is built upon the United States' ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Civil Defense Program represents a serious crack in the foundation of assured destruction. If estimates of the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense are correct, the United States no longer possesses the capability to inflict what the Defense Department has determined to be unacceptable damage. Various Secretaries of Defense have defined unacceptable damage as destruction of two-thirds of Soviet industry, twenty-five percent of their population and 200 major cities; yet, most experts on Soviet civil defense state that the United States could destroy only five percent of the Soviet population and ten percent of their industry, and that they could recover in two to four years. (26:53)

As noted above, the Soviet Union endured losses much greater than this during WW II and still emerged as a world power. If the United States does not have the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, then assured destruction capability does not exist and the strategy of deterrence lacks a

credible foundation.

Deter From What?

If our ability to deter the Soviet Union is in doubt, it would be wise to look at what it is we are trying to deter the Soviets from doing. The goal of deterrence is to prevent the Soviet Union from endangering US security interests. These interests are contained in the DOD Annual Report FY 1979 and include:

1. Freedom from the danger of direct attack on US territory.
2. Free access to external sources of raw material, especially oil.
3. Uninterrupted access to critical air and sea lanes.
4. Prevent major sources of economic strength from falling into unfriendly hands.
5. Independence and territorial integrity of Western Europe, Israel, and Japan.
6. Independence of Middle East, Persian Gulf, Northeast Asia, and Africa, and freedom of the air and sea routes to them. (1:16,17)

These interests are diverse and cover most of the globe, but can be reduced to the basic concept that the United States should be free to pursue its national goals unencumbered by the threat of direct attack or by encirclement by a world under the hegemony of an unfriendly power. However, these US security interests are directly opposed by stated Soviet goals. Dr Leon Gouré said that:

Soviet military doctrine is based on the fundamental premise that the interests and objectives of the two opposing systems - the Communist and the Capitalist - must remain "irreconcilable." By virtue of the "laws of class struggles," they are locked into an unrelenting and unavoidable rivalry as the new world order, led by the Soviet Union, seeks to replace the old, led by the United States. (27:47)

This fundamental premise of Soviet doctrine places it directly at odds with the United States. The General Secretary of the Communist Party, L. I. Brezhnev confirmed this in his keynote address to the XXV Congress of the Communist Party when he said that the national purpose of the Soviet Union was . . . "to create a universal classless society under Soviet leadership." He further stated that one of the national goals of the Soviet Union would be to "Organize and sustain, under Soviet leadership, a world community of Socialist states until communism can reach its ultimate potential." (23:189)

These statements clearly indicate that the Soviet Union's goal is world hegemony, which directly conflict with most of the United States' security interests listed above. As long as the United States had the ability to deter the Soviets from pursuing their goals to the point where they threatened US security interests, these Soviet proclamations could be considered political rhetoric. However, the doubtful status of US deterrent capability will give the Soviets many opportunities to realize their ambitions.

Possible Soviet Actions

An effective Soviet civil defense system and the United States' lack of one have weakened our ability to deter the Soviet Union and have greatly enhanced their ability to deter the United States. Dr Foy Kohler has said that "These asymmetries are of great strategic significance for making Soviet power credible as a deterrent and as an instrument of policy." (2:xvi) The most obvious deterrent effect on the United States is that a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union can no longer be considered a viable threat. During the 1962 Cuba missile crisis, the United States was able to make the Soviets back down by threatening the Soviet Union with a nuclear attack. Because of the Soviet civil defense effort and the growth of their nuclear capability, a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union today would result in the destruction of the United States and only moderate damage to the Soviet Union. Dr Kohler also stated that "The Soviet Union could well conclude that the United States' threat of massive retaliation has no credibility except as an act of sheer desperation." (2:xvi) Carrying this concept one step further leads to the conclusion that the United States is now deterred from any rational escalation of a theater war to a strategic level. This will force the United States to keep any conflict at a conventional or local nuclear level, where the Soviets

have overwhelming superiority. The most serious situation would be a Soviet conventional attack in Western Europe. The United States would be faced with the dilemma of being defeated in Europe on a conventional level or of engaging the Soviets in a futile strategic nuclear exchange which would result in the destruction of the United States and not of the Soviet Union.

It would not be accurate to contend that the Soviets are eagerly anticipating a nuclear exchange, or that they would initiate such an exchange except as a last resort. The important fact is that the Soviets are prepared both physically and psychologically to endure a nuclear war if they feel it is necessary. This preparation has given the Soviets increased political and military bargaining power and the confidence to use it to the United States' disadvantage.

This new-found confidence will result in increased Soviet aggressiveness in many areas of the world. The most likely area for Soviet action is in Third World nations, but could also include the Mid-East, Korea, Yugoslavia, or anywhere else the Soviets see an opportunity for gain. Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas C. Reed, in his farewell address on 14 January 1977, said that he is lead ". . . inescapably to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is driving for strategic and tactical superiority by the early 1980s; that they are improving their forces and digging in their society for that purpose; and that they may

use the resulting military muscle and social survivability to force a geopolitical showdown in the early 1980s." (30:1)

Communist doctrine dictates that the Soviets must take an active part in pushing the Third World countries toward communism. Dr Leon Gouré contends that "The Soviet Union considers it a sacred duty to support the global revolutionary and national liberation process. . . against imperialism while shielding these movements from Western military intervention." (27:47) Politburo member M. A. Suslov said that the support of these movements is "one of the paramount principles of Soviet foreign policy. . . and one of the most important manifestations of the external function" of the Soviet military. (27:47) We have already seen increased Soviet involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, and Yemen. We should expect to see more aggressive involvement in the future. The growing Soviet hegemony in these areas is made possible by their increasing ability to project military power and by their improved ability to protect their country from nuclear retaliation. The Soviet civil defense system has made a significant contribution to Soviet expansionism, which threatens US security interests of an independent Africa, free access to external sources of raw material, and uninterrupted access to critical air and sea lanes.

Other areas for Soviet aggressive activity are limited only by the imagination, but could include any of the following:

1) A violent domestic crisis in one or more European countries, involving a leftist takeover by force (Spain or Portugal) or refusal of an incumbent leftist government to obey popular elections voting them out of office (Italy). The leftist government would ask for Soviet help in exchange for basing rights for Soviet forces. 2) A military conflict between two European countries (Greece and Turkey) in which one country would request Soviet help as a last resort to save itself, in exchange for Soviet access to the Mediterranean. 3) Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia to "restore peace" after Tito's death. 4) Soviet support for a popular uprising in Saudi Arabia that would result in Mideast oil falling under Soviet control.

The Soviet Civil Defense Program, as an integral part of the growing Soviet military capability, has given the Soviets the flexibility and confidence they need to expand their hegemony while at the same time has severely limited the United States' flexibility and capability to respond to Soviet actions.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States is long past the point where the Soviet Civil Defense Program can be ignored. Immediate steps must be taken to correct the imbalance in strategic capability caused by the Soviet advances in civil defense, before the Soviets are able to turn this imbalance into irreversible gains. The United States must recognize the problem, improve both its active and passive civil defense efforts, and insist that civil defense be a part of any future arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The United States cannot begin to recognize the problems posed by Soviet civil defense efforts until US decision-makers update their thinking on the possibilities of nuclear war. It is thinkable and it can be survivable. The United States must realize that civil defense is an essential element of deterrence, no less important than ICBMs or B-52s. Because deterrence is a state of mind, the United States must understand the Soviet way of thinking and find means of deterrence which are credible to the Soviets. Decision-makers in the US must understand the Soviet view of nuclear war and how the Soviets fit civil defense into that view. Professor Richard Pipes

clearly pinpointed the nature of the problem when he said:
"There is something innately destabilizing in the very fact
that we consider nuclear war unfeasible and suicidal for both,
and our chief adversary views it as feasible and winnable for
himself." (29:16)

Once the concept of civil defense as a means of deterrence
is understood, the American people will be more willing to
spend tax dollars on both passive and active civil defense
measures. It is doubtful that we could ever, or would even
want to, match the Soviets dollar-for-dollar on civil defense;
but even a small investment by the United States could give us
a much improved civil defense system. Defense Civil Preparedness
Agency (DCPA) Director John E. Davis said that \$200 million a
year for the next five years would allow completion of Crisis
Relocation Planning for over 400 high risk areas. He feels that
US casualties could be reduced by 70,000,000 people. (26:56)
The Boeing study estimates that simple protective measures
costing \$2.5 billion could protect all essential US industry
from blast overpressures of 200 to 300 psi. Active civil
defense measures will require increased US investment in anti-
ballistic missile technology, including lasers and charged
particle beams. The Soviets already have a substantial lead
in this area. (31:14) These efforts must be taken to decrease
the civil defense asymmetry and to demonstrate our intent to

the Soviet Union. Anything less will indicate a lack of national will and could encourage the Soviets to exploit their advantages.

To complement the United States' efforts to improve civil defense, US decision-makers must also recognize the threat to deterrence posed by Soviet civil defense. They must insist that civil defense be included in the strategic equation and that it play an important part in any future arms limitation agreements.

The United States cannot continue to bury its head in the sand rather than openly confront the problems of survival in a nuclear war. Our primary competitor in the world arena has already spent twenty years working on the problem, and his solutions are giving him more than the ability to survive a nuclear war. The increased Soviet military capability, which is strongly supported by an effective civil defense system, has given the Soviet Union a growing confidence that it can expand its area of hegemony without fear of US intervention, and that it can fight and win a nuclear war if necessary. The United States must reduce that level of confidence or suffer the consequences.

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